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This article describes some reasons that initiated protest movements in Russia and Egypt
in 2011. The author thinks that the conﬂict in the political elite made was an important
background that made thousands of people take to the streets of the cities. Russian and
Egyptian political systems, that seem to be so different, had much in common in fact:
hidden struggle between conservative «people of force» and liberals. The situation was
aggravated by the coming elections and consequences of the international economic crisis.
The research is based on Russian and Egyptian Media materials.
Copyright  2013, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Here, we consider some political factors that resulted in
mass protests both in Egypt and in Russia. At ﬁrst sight, it
does not seem correct to compare the accomplished up-
heaval in Egypt with only a few major demonstrations in
Russia, the more so as these two countries are very
different. However, if we consider the situations in Egypt
and in Russia in more detail, we can reveal some similar
plots, which make it possible to explain, at least partly, the
reasons for these riots.
There is no denying that all revolutions, both successful
and aborted, imply deeply rooted political, social, andarch Center, Hanyang
r
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Haeconomic prerequisites. Different researchers attempted to
reveal some universal key («crucial») reasons for social
tumult both in Arabic countries and in Russia, and these
attempts often led to extended generalizations, in partic-
ular, in the analysis of the political component of revolu-
tionary processes. In numerous Western studies, primarily
in those of liberal origin, the regimes in both Russia and
Egypt were frequently estimated as similarly authoritarian,
and therefore, similarly doomed to revolutionary trans-
formations. Estimate of the political system of Egypt as a
clunky autocratic mechanism, eventually cracked and
collapsed under the pressure of discontentedmasses, is one
of the most widespread concepts of the «Egyptian Spring»;
such abrupt brush-strokes and straightforward cliches to a
great extent simplify, if not distort, the real situation. Dur-
ing the tumults of 2011, a number of Western and Russian
opposition-oriented media also focused their attention on
the authoritarian nature of the power in Russia, on Putin’s
omnipotence and on his virtual «irremovability». One of the
most popular (and making everyone’s mouth sore) claimsnyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1 Suponina E. Mubarak’s Mistake. Aug 4, 2011.//http://www.forbes.ru/
ekonomika-column/vlast/71636-oshibka-mubaraka.
2 Elshami N. Egypt’s 2011 Presidential Election: the Mubaraks and the
Strategy of Ambiguity. 11.11.10//http://muftah.org/egypts-2011-
presidential-election-the-mubaraks-and-the-strategy-of-ambiguity-by-
nancy-elshami/.
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intended to be) in power for a long time, thereby violating a
universal democratic principle of interchangeability of
power, applied in a number of states. Hence, allegedly, is
the reason for the actions undertaken by the «middle class»
or «educated youth», tired of the dictatorship and suddenly
ripen for the protest. The author believes that due to the
liberal media, the role of «revolutionary grass roots» was
romanticized and exaggerated, while the image of power
simpliﬁed and diabolized. Out of the blue, revolutionary
bloggers and opposition activists turned into creators of the
revolution, though in fact they were its instruments. The
simpliﬁed cliché of «people against a tyrant» applied to the
events in Arabic countries and in Russia should be seriously
criticized, and instead processes should be revealed that
most often stay hidden – those related to political elites.
I am deeply convinced that in both Egypt and Russia the
real ﬁght for the future of the country was not put up on the
squares of the capital cities, but inside the political elite,
where different groups tried to gain political and economic
inﬂuence. To this end, they used media, «independent
bloggers», «social movements», efforts of the «civil soci-
ety», and other modern instruments.
1. The presidents
The fact that Mubarak had irremovably ruled the
country for many terms of ofﬁce in a row, did not at all
doom him to imminent collapse due to revolution. Two
important reasons for what happened in Egypt were the
president’s age (83, by the time of his overthrow) and the
unsettled problem of the succession of power. It is
obvious that Mubarak, the aged head of the leading state
in the region, the leader devoid of his former charisma
and political energy, should have had a clear plan for
transition of the power, a plan, which could have been
accepted by the Egyptian elite. 83 is a risky age for
presidency, especially taking into account the rumors of
Mubarak’s illness. (Recall that Leonid Brezhnev, who
most frequently personiﬁes the image of a senile ruler in
Russian media, died at 76.) Undoubtedly, given the
President’s age, the issue of power transition was one of
the most important problems in political life in Egypt.
The probable version was that, according to Middle East
political traditions, the power would be inherited by the
President’s son, Gamal Mubarak. Recall here Syria, where
in 2000 Bashar Assad, aged 34, an ophthalmologist
physician, took his deceased father’s stand and headed
the country. Summoning Bashar was a wise decision of
the Syrian ruling establishment: the deceased President
Assad’s son, who had never planned to become a Presi-
dent himself and who had been estranged from political
affairs, was easy to manipulate with and thereby pre-
sented a perfect compromise. In Egypt, however, in order
to provide the power transition to Gamal Mubarak from
his father, Gamal was to be approved by Egyptian
establishment, which was represented by the military.
Starting from Nasser, all Egyptian Presidents had come
from the Army, which was a speciﬁc caste in the society.
This system did not suppose inheritance of power.
Thereby, Mubarak in fact challenged the system.On the eve of the election in 2005, as Mubarak was
already 77, many analysts forecasted change, predicted a
new candidate from the party in power. In February, 2005
Mubarak sensationally introduced corrections to the 76-th
Article of the Constitution. Now, several candidates repre-
senting different political trends in the country were
allowed to take part in the elections, instead of the only
possible one. In Western press, the decision to alter the
voting system was named the peaceful «palm-tree revolu-
tion». Some took it as a step to real democracy, while others
as the preliminaries to the transition of power to Gamal
Mubarak.
Three years later, Egypt would end up in a “turbulence
zone”: the worldwide economic crisis, bread price spiral,
food problems, and so on. Had Hosni Mubarak stepped
down frompower prior to theworld economic crisis, which
seriously hurt Egypt, his monuments could be still getting
erected all over the country.1 However, before the regular
president election that were to be held in 2011, the situa-
tion with the successor was still unclear. Mubarak was
keeping the suspense, neither denying nor conﬁrming his
standing for election. American partners of Egypt insisted
that the election be democratic and honest. Behind
Mubarak, inﬂuential elite ﬁgures hovered, like Omar
Suleiman, Head of Intelligence Service, and Marshal Tan-
tawi; they considered themselves worthy enough to take
up the Presidency. Mubarak could neither openly put in his
son instead of himself, nor simply leave power. Nancy
Elshami, a columnist from Mefhtah Magazine, suggests
that, in order to “in-throne” Gamal under these conditions,
it would have been easier to wait until Hosni Mubarak died
and then to introduce his son as the savior of the nation
from political vacuum and possible instability.2 Might it
have been the reason why Mubarak consciously came into
ofﬁce, the end of which he could well expect not to reach?
Curious enough is the fact that Mubarak did not assign the
Vice-President (in fact, his ofﬁcial successor), which pro-
vides evidence that he tried to avoid power transition to his
colleagues, the «people of force».
It was Hosni Mubarak’s intention to transfer his power
to Gamal that triggered the conﬂict among political groups
and resulted in the crisis of the regime.3
By 2008, the Russian leader Vladimir Putin also faced
complicated problems. For Putin, whose third Presidential
term would have been critically taken in the West, it was
very important in this situation to ﬁnd a successor, the one
whose appointment would not violate the balance of forces
in the political elite. Just as Mubarak, Putin also was the
mediator in the political game, keeping his balance be-
tween various groups inside the political elite. The very fact
that Putin was NOT to be President for at least four
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the ascension of a new ruler in Kremlin could not help
having an impact on the state of political groups. According
to the opinion of a political analyst P. Palazhchenko,
«Putin’s decision not to run for the third term of the ofﬁce
in 2008 was the ﬁrst step to erosion of the system.4»
Luckily, for Putin the age problem was not so acute as it
was for Mubarak. However, like Mubarak, Putin faced the
same choice, the one which would not provoke a riot of the
elite, would not result in a dramatic change in the balance
of political forces, and would make it possible for him to
return after the four years.
Some Western media are eager to mirror Mubarak and
Putin as power-seeking dictators. But, were they really
«dictators», they would not have undertaken such serious
efforts to “stick to the rules”, speciﬁed by inner and inter-
national laws. Mubarak would have declared his son to be
his successor, and Putinwould simply have run for the third
time. Of course, these leaders concentrated great authority
in their hands, both in the same time they were (and Putin
still is) prisoners of political situation, both local and
international.
2. The successors
Now we will compare two important ﬁgures in Russian
and Egyptian modern history, Gamal Mubarak and Dmitry
Medvedev. This juxtaposition, being at ﬁrst thought unex-
pected and even paradoxical, in fact can answer questions
related to notorious «political prerequisites» for upheavals
in both Egypt and Russia. Unlike Dmitry Medvedev, Gamal
Mubarak did not become President. But both of these pol-
iticians anchored most hopes of liberals and Westerners,
who represent one of inﬂuential groups in the political
elites both in Russia and in Egypt.
Dmitry Medvedev and Gamal Mubarak have always
positioned themselves as reasonable liberals and pro-
gressivists, by all means trying to maintain their image of
secular and modern representatives of the new generation
of leaders of the XXI century. (Recall here Medvedev’s
affection toward Twitter and iPad.) Both had not descended
from military structures or security services (in contrast to
Hosni Mubarak and Vladimir Putin). Both were extremely
positively perceived in the West. In one of his interviews,
answering a question about political leaders who set the
example for him, Gamal Mubarak named Winston
Churchill and Margaret Thatcher.5 In his interview, he ar-
gues pragmatically, underlining the importance of tradi-
tions but at the same time insisting on the necessity for
liberal reforms and modernization of Egyptian society.
Mubarak Jr. and Dmitry Medvedev are peers: Gamal
Mubarak was born in December, 1963, Dmitry Medvedev in
September, 1965. They were involved into politics essen-
tially at the same time, too. D. Medvedev started his career
in Moscow in November, 1999, when, owing to Putin, he
was appointed Deputy Chief of the Government Staff of the4 Palazhchenko P. The Future of Democratic Movement.//Vedomosti,
14.01.13.
5 Gamal Mubarak: "We Need Audacious Leaders"//Middle East Quar-
terly. Winter 2009, pp. 67–73.Russian Federation. Gamal Mubarak in the year 2000
opened his public policy career entering the Secretariat of
the ruling National Democratic Party of Egypt (NDP). In
2002, Gamal was already the Head of Political Department
of NDP; in turn, in 2003 Medvedev becomes Chief of the
President Administration of RF. Key events occur in the
lives of both Mubarak Jr. and Medvedev in 2004–2005. In
November, 2004, President of Egypt and his son spoke at
the Conference of the dominant National Democratic party
promising economical and political reforms, which were to
be «inaugurational» for Gamal. While publically denying
the very possibility of the inheritance of power by his son,
Hosni Mubarak nonetheless positioned him as «the man
who is able to steer the country to the new direction6».
(Note that the Congress of the government party of Egypt
was carried out under a truly Gorbachev-type slogan «New
Thinking and Reform Priorities».) Mubarak Jr. was dele-
gated to a complicated strategic sector of work; despite the
difﬁculties, success might have provided him the high au-
thority in Egyptian society, support from both the people
and the elite, and legitimacy of the further steps of power
transition.
Meanwhile, in Russia processes were launched that
would ﬁnally lead Dmitry Medvedev to power. On
September 5, 2005 President of RF Vladimir Putin in his
State-of-the-Nation Address to the Government, Parlia-
ment, and regional leaders announced the Program of top-
priority national projects, supervised by the inconspicuous
Vice-Prime-Minister D. Medvedev. The author of this study
is convinced that it was the supervisory responsibility for
the National projects (thoroughly covered by the media)
that raised Medvedev’s rating dramatically and made him
at least well-known, if not popular in the country. Note that
the Russian version of «National projects» as a means for
promotion of the future candidate for President ofﬁce was
much less risky than the Egyptian «reforms». The word
«reforms», endlessly uttered by Russian democrats since
the early 90-pes, was eventually discredited by them and
passed out of political use. On the contrary, National pro-
jects were generously sponsored and pursued noble aims of
improving people’s life, raising the level of health care and
education, providing the people with affordable housing,
developing agriculture. Here, it is beside our purpose to
evaluate the efﬁciency and real usefulness of the «National
projects»; note, however, that Medvedev’s gatekeeping
went smoothly and without scandals, which might have
corrupted his image, while one of Medvedev’s
«competitors», Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov, appeared
to be involved in several disagreeable cases, and as a result
fell out of the race. (Extending the analogy, we can compare
Ivanov, a conservative and a «hawk», with Omar Suleiman,
an «old guard» representative, who also was considered a
possible successor of the President Hosni Mubarak.) While
presidential ambitions of Gamal Mubarak can be clearly
explained by his father will, though not expressed formally,
question is, why Putin recommended Medvedev for Presi-
dency, given that Medvedev had nothing to do with6 Isaev G.G. Egypt: who will be Mubarak’s heir.(in Russian)//AFRO,
2005.
9 Roll Stephan, Gamal Mubarak and the discord in Egypt’s ruling
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counted in the 2000-es? The answer is that, on the one
hand, Putin needed a dependable and at the same time
non-charismatic person, and on the other hand, this choice
made it possible to maintain the balance of forces in
Russian establishment. As far back as in 2005, three years
before the Presidential election, this situation was
explained by Sergei Markov, Director of the Institute of
Political Studies: «Lately, Putin has shorten the reins, and
the chekists have been «up». He trusts them more and
more. If the successor comes from them, the balance of
forces will be dramatically violated, the coalition may be
destroyed, and then a per acute political crisis will occur.7»
3. Groups in the governing class
Consideration of activities of different groups and frac-
tions within political elite is a complicated issue for a
researcher. Snippets of information concerning processes
within the establishment, published or declared mostly by
very politically committed persons, do not make it possible
to derive a non-biased estimate of the situation in the
ruling class. Nevertheless, combining fragments of infor-
mation, opinions of independent experts, and conclusions
that may be made from claims of politicians, one can obtain
an approximate view on what is going on in the political
elite.
The overall pattern of key groups in the elites of Egypt
and Russia is essentially the same: conservators, on the one
side, and liberals, on the other.
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak comes from the
military environment. After the revolution of 1952, the
military in Egypt was in power, taking key state ofﬁces.
They also played an important role in the economy: the
Army participated in many Egyptian industries.8 However,
in the last decade, a new generation of politicians appeared
in Egypt – they promoted liberalization in Egyptian market,
thereby fulﬁlling the obligations given by Egypt when it
had been admitted to WTO.8 These politicians grouped
around Gamal Mubarak and represented the liberal
kindred, which was ready to replace Egyptian «people of
force». The new Egyptian government formed by the liberal
Ahmed Nazif in July, 2004 included several people from
Gamal’s immediate surround. There were businessmen,
bankers, supporters of the liberal way. According to West-
ern economists, the new Egyptian government aimed at
liberal economical transformations. The launch of tax,
customs, and banking reforms was announced. Behind
Gamal, young businessmen lined up, who gathered their
wealth in the course of privatization and who longed for
extension of the liberal line marked out by Mubarak Jr.
Conservators backed the powerful public sector and the
protectionist policy; they were against liberal reforms, in
particular, under the condition of the world crisis, which
hurt Egypt. Representatives of the «old guard» were7 Who struggles with whom under the Kremlin carpet (Kto s kem
boretsya pod Kremlevskim kovrom.)//Komsomol’skaya Pravda. 2 June,
2005.
8 Isayev G.G. Interview with RF Trade Representative in Egypt A.Esyu-
tin. March 16, 2006. Author’s Personal Files.irritated by the growing inﬂuence of «political
entrepreneurs» grouped around Gamal Mubarak. Among
the latter were afﬂuent businessmen, who had accumu-
lated vast wealth during the spell of economical reforms:
the steel tycoon Ahmed Ezz, businessmanMuhammed Abu
Al-aynen, moguls Mohamed Mansour and Ahmed el-
Maghrabi.9
Thereby, domestic policy processes in Egypt on the eve
of the revolution essentially reduced to confrontation be-
tween liberals («new guard») and the conservative «old
guard». The fact of the confrontation inside the Egyptian
elite is conﬁrmed by the documents published in the
Internet by Wikileaks, which provide evidence for tough
struggle for power between Gamal Mubarak, on the one
hand, and Omar Suleiman and Marshal Tantawi on the
other.10 Although one can never tell whether anonymous
Wikileaks documents are a reliable source of information,
this evidence still looks likely. In these documents, an
anonymous Egyptian deputy even mentions an Army
takeover as a probable solution for the problem of
strengthened confrontation between conservators and
liberals.
With the start of Putin’s presidency, the proportion of
descendants from military environment and secret service
in the governing class increased dramatically. As a result,
the «conservative» coalition in the elite was formed. In
2000-es, virtually one in four in the establishment was
from the structures of force. In bulk, the descendants from
security services were skeptical with regard to state liber-
alization; they represented the most conservative element
of Putin’s team and tried to gain total control over political
and economic life in Russia.11 On the other hand, the
«liberals» were referred as supporters of the formation of
Western-type economy in Russia, of economic and political
liberalization. Putin, as it was said above, played the role of
the mediator of processes in the elite, whose aimwas not to
let any group strengthen too much.
Undoubtedly, the trickiest question refers to the relation
between the groups inside the elite: was it really confron-
tational? And another thing – does the antagonism be-
tween liberals and “hawks” really exists? For example,
Catherine Belton, a political analyst of The Financial Times
suggests that the Russian ruling elite at that time was a
single team. At the same time, she notes: «However,
different fractions in the elite, which are supported by
different segments of Russian big business and pursue
different interests, struggle for privatized state assets and
for the inﬂuence on the economical policy of the country».
Russian media frequently mention two wings of the
Russian power, which were in perfect accord with regard to
strategic issues, but which could disagree upon personnel
affairs and economic problems.elite.//Egypt Independent. 02.09.2010. http://www.egyptindependent.
com/opinion/gamal-mubarak-and-discord-egypts-ruling-elite.
10 Omar Suleiman a threat to Gamal Mubarak.//http://propagandapress.
wordpress.com/2011/01/29/omar-suleiman-a-threat-to-gamal-mubarak-
wikileaks/.
11 Delyagin M. The Liberal Kindred has gone on the warpath.//http://
delyagin.ru/articles/37118.html.
14 Mamed-zade P. Results of Parliament Election in Egypt.//http://www.
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denies any consent in the governing elite. He insists on the
existence of a conﬂict in the establishment, between
«liberal fundamentalists, who believe that the state must
serve Russian business rather than people [...], and power-
wielding moguls, pietistically devoted to the idea that it
should serve personally to them.11» The mogul politician
Mikhail Prokhorov conﬁrms the version of the struggle
between two wings of power, liberal and conservative, in
his interview to New York Times.12
It still remains unclear, what might have provoked the
conﬂict inside the elite in the studied time. As we said,
Putin’s temporary «escape» affected the elite conﬁguration.
Undoubtedly, the world economic crisis of 2008–2009 also
played its role: it resulted in «strengthening contradictions
between different ﬁnancial and industrial groups con-
cerning the accession of Russia to WTO. Arguments be-
tween supporters of preservation of the «social stability»
and those who demanded to accelerate the liberal reforms
also intensiﬁed.12» In addition, the country was on the
verge of a large-scale privatization of state assets, which
deepened the confrontation between groups in the elite.
4. The crisis
Prior to and immediately after the 2010 parliamentary
election, the political situation in Egypt was strained. An
upsurge of indignation in society was raised by the death of
a young Egyptian Khaled Said, who had been assassinated
by the police and then became a symbol of the protest
movement. The police and personally the EgyptianMinister
of Internal Affairs Habib el-Adly were ﬁercely criticized by
opposition. Habib el-Adly was considered one of the most
devoted to Hosni Mubarak people: he had been keeping his
post since 1997 and enjoyed President’s conﬁdence.13
In any country, election is accompanied by activation of
all political forces. In February, 2010, the former IAEA Di-
rector Mohamed ElBaradei arrived in Egypt and attempted
“to rock the boat”with ambitious political declarations and
appeals to Egyptians to ignore the forthcoming parlia-
mentary election.
On the verge of important events – the parliamentary
election and the subsequent presidential election in 2011 –
the authorities decided to take some steps in order to keep
the “Muslim Brotherhood” off the new parliament. This
Islamic organization, one of the largest in the world, had
been banned in Egypt for many years. However, at the
previous election of 2005, 88 its members entered the
parliament as independent candidates, which hit the
headlines and inspired the «Brotherhood». As it was noted
by a Moscow orientalist P. Mamed-zade, «the liberalization
of the political “game rules”, triggered by the authorities in
2005, instantly took effect and put in the front row the
forces that for a long time had been in a quasi-legal state.
Now these forces were ready for vigorous activity and the12 Sakhnin A. Three programs of “decemberists” movement.//http://
grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/194637.html.
13 Rana Muhammad Taha, Hend Kortam, Nouran El-Behairy The Rise
and fall of Mubarak//Daily News Egypt/February 11, 2013 http://www.
dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/11/the-rise-and-fall-of-mubarak/.race for power.14» The «Brotherhood» ﬁnally was not let to
the new parliament, and, as the Islamic movements were
very popular, this resulted in people’s disaffection. The
opposition pointed at numerous violations and even fraud
at the parliament election. Although the results of the
election did not unleash ferment, as it later happened in
Russia, they became one of the reasons for the increase in
the protest moods.
In order to destabilize the situation and call tens of
thousands people to the streets, some high-proﬁle event
was needed. And that was the riot in Tunisia. On January 14,
President of Tunisia was ousted, and this was the signal for
the Egyptian opposition. Immediately after the events in
Tunisia, it started planning the walkout, expanding calls to
the action through Facebook and Twitter. The number of
their users had dramatically increased for several previous
years, same as that of Egyptians joining different USA-
inspired programs related to non-governmental and op-
position organizations.15 The protest action had been
carefully planned and well-organized: the lines of march
and velocities for different ﬁles and groups of protesters
had been prescribed, more than twenty Internet sites and
numerous groups in social networks had been placing the
relevant information, and in poor areas, where no Internet
was available, leaﬂets had been spread.16 The day of the
action had also been chosen for a reason: January, 25 was
“The Police Day”. The marchers wanted to protest against
the actions of the police and to demand the removal of the
odious Minister of Internal Affairs. The latter appeal was
supported by many, as the police brutality and corruption
were among the most charged problems in the society. As
we said above, Habib el-Adly was considered a Mubarak’s
man, and in the critical moment for his patron he proved
his ﬁdelity: while the Army only passively observed the
course of events, and the security service had done nothing
to prevent the street riots, the police faced the attack.
As in many other Middle East countries, in Egypt the
issues of national security had always been given special
attention. The security service had a great experience in
counteraction to opposition activities. It is hard to believe
that the secret service had not noticed the preparations to
January, 25 and had overlooked such exacerbation of the
situation. It was possible to quell the rebellion, even though
the youth used the Internet for mobilization and the pop-
ular frustrationwas very high, especially after the events in
Tunisia, covered in detail by Quatarian “Al Jazeera” TV-
channel. But even if the suspicions concerning the delib-
erate failure of the security service might seem unjustiﬁed
and contrived, the position taken by the Army seems much
clearer. From the very start of the upheaval, the Egyptian
Army was on the fence. Even though it was technically
capable of breaking up the demonstration (or at leastiimes.ru/rus/stat/2005/16-12-05a.htm.
15 In more detail, see: Tsvetkova N. American factor in Arab revolts:
mobilization via public diplomacy and social networks. http://meast.ru/
article/amerikanskii-faktor-v-arabskikh-revolyutsiyakh-mobilizatsiya-
protesta-cherez-publichnuyu-dip.
16 Levinson C., Coker M. The Secret Rally That Sparked an Uprising.//The
Wall street journal, February 11, 2011.
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take any attempts to quell the uproar. The military safe-
guarded the most important objects but did not interfere
with the protesters, and indifferently watched the police
acting. An American political analyst George Friedman as-
serts that it was because the military in fact supported the
demand for Mubarak’s removal that they did not confront
with the protesters.17 Mubarak could have outwaited the
«Tahrir standing» and kept his power, if it had not been for
the «palace coup». Friedmanwrites that in fact the Egyptian
mayhem was very limited: there were no more than
300,000 people at Tahrir, which is not very impressive for
the seventeen-million Cairo. The Egyptian events cannot be
compared with the Iran revolution in 1979, where really
powerful social protests had been exposed.18
It was not on Tahrir that the fate of the country was
being determined. For all those days, offstage struggle in
the highest branches of power was underway, which ended
by the victory of «the old guard». We can point the exact
date of the «coup d’etat»: January 29, 2011, when the Prime
Minister Ahmed Nazif, one of the key liberals, was ousted.
He was substituted by the former Egyptian Air Force
Commander-in-Chief Ahmed Shaﬁq. On the same day,
Mubarak appointed the Chief of Intelligence Service Omar
Suleiman Vice-President. On January, 29, both Mubarak’s
sons with their families ﬂew to London, which heralded the
ﬁnal defeat of the liberal wing of Egyptian elite. By forcing
Mubarak to appoint Omar Suleiman his successor, “people
of force” had removed their competitors. It had apparently
been agreed that Mubarak would keep his Presidency for a
while: on February, 1, in his address to the nation on TV, he
promised that he would not take part in the 2011 election,
but he refused to resign from Presidency immediately. The
point of no return, however, had been already behind: the
situation in the streets of Cairo gradually grew out of con-
trol and protesters demanded the President’s resign more
and more persistently. On February 2 and 3, some Mubar-
ak’s «supporters» appeared in the streets, who tried to
“turn the tide”, but in vain. It became clear that the lid had
been lifted and only the dismissal of President may put the
youth on Tahrire out of suspense. On February, 11 Mubarak
resigned from his post, having devolved his power to the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (not to the Vice-
President). Apparently, it was the result of the next
“palace coup”, this time of the ﬁght between «top-
brassers». Later, this ﬁght would end with the defeat of
Omar Suleiman and his removal.
One should agreewith the British orientalist Cris Philips,
who critically estimated the romantic version of «The
Arabian Spring» as that of the victory of the people over the
dictatorship. In his opinion, anti-government popular un-
rest cannot result in the overthrow of power without
support from the key segments of the elite, especially of




19 Phillips Chris, Coup d’état or Revolution?//http://www.majalla.com/
eng/2011/09/article55226050.efforts of conservators on the background of the social
upheaval.
Despite the world economical crisis, which aggravated
the situation in the elite, Vladimir Putin, evenwhen he was
out of Presidency, kept both the control over key policies
and his credibility in the society. In 2008, DmitryMedvedev
was elected President of the RF. Later, estimating the
«Medvedev» time, researchers’ opinions divided: some
found real changes, up to liberalization of political life in
Russia, while others denied Medvedev’s independence and
called his reforms imitational. Indeed, both these state-
ments are true. This is wrong to suggest that during his
ofﬁce, Medvedev only «kept it booked» to bring it back to
Putin after four years. Like Gamal Mubarak, Medvedev
became the one whom Russian liberals and their foreign
partners anchored their hopes on. It has been discussed up
to now, whether Medvedev headed the «liberal kindred» in
power elites or whether he was taken by this group to its
advantage. For example, M. Delyagin openly called Med-
vedev the leader and «frontman» of liberals. On the other
hand, the chief editor of Regnum News Agency Modest
Kolerov suggested that it was the liberals who tried «to
adjoin him [Medvedev] and to hug him to death20.»
In fact, Medvedev eventually did not undertake any
serious political turnarounds which might be treated as
liberal. Only Medvedev’s declamation was mainly liberal.
However, during his presidency, important staff re-
placements occured. «Medvedev’s people» took over a
number of positions in the state management. Unlike many
representatives of Putin’s «old guard», they did not come
from power structure; it would be better to call them
«liberal technocrats». Respectively, for the time of Medve-
dev’s ofﬁce the number of «top-brassers» in power
decreased: at the end of 2007, there were 55% of those who
used to wear Army or Security Service shoulder loops, while
in the middle of 2011 their proportion lowered to 20%.21
Medvedev considered his staff management in regions
successful. «I have changed virtually a half of the governors’
body rather than two dozens of them,» – he claimed inMay,
2011 in the press-conference in Skolkovo.22 In these “staff
purges” sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya sees one of the
reasons for the weakening of power: «In this I see parallels
with Gorbachov and Yeltsin, who had attacked their own
bureaucracy and then, without its support, could not keep
their balance. They sawed off the bough on which they
were sitting.23» In fact, however, Medvedev’s aim was to
weaken the bureaucracy in favor of «the liberal kindred»,
equally as to weaken top-brassers (through the reform of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the bureaucratic
«United Russia» (through anti-corruption measures). As a
result, however, Medvedev’s noble-minded steps against
corruption virtually discredited the image of power: the20 Pimenov A. About Putin and Medvedev. Liberal kindred//Voice of
America, 24.05.11 http://www.golos-ameriki.ru/content/putin-elections-
2011-05-24-122532879/234916.html.
21 Contemporary Russian Elite – what’s this? Olga Kryshtanovskaya’s
interview at Radio Finam.fm, 10.06.2011.
22 Dorofeev V. Dmitry Medvedev. The Man Who Stopped the Time.
Moscow, 2012.
23 All business is in the «cap»//Ogonuyok, 20.09.2010.
G. Isaev / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 60–6766“show trials” did not lead to imprisonment of any “heavy-
weights”, instead, the society only stronger felt that the
power was totally putrid. The reform of the Ministry of the
Interior was reduced to renaming “militia” to “police”;
along with that, the Ministry was strongly hit ideologically.
Medvedev had begun his Presidency with the promise of
serious changes, but he only changed the image of power to
worse. The net result was simply that he became unpopular
President.
According to polls carried out by «Levada Center», in
2010–2011 Medvedev’s rating was falling. «The population
is dissatisﬁed with both economical (65.5% unfavorable
comments) and political course (50.5%). People did not
blame the “ruling tandem” for that; nonetheless, the
question “who personally in Russia is basically responsible
for the troubles and the cost-of-living increase”was mostly
answered by the name of Medvedev (40.7%).24 In Russia,
the slips in the Chief Executive’s popularity often results in
a negative impact on the total power system that he per-
soniﬁes. In addition, the “tandem”model itself was unusual
and nonconventional for Russian political culture. During
2011, it was perpetually discussed how ﬁrm the tandem
was and whether it could crack. As the day of President
election approached, the question occurred more andmore
frequently, who would in fact run for the ofﬁce, Medvedev
or Putin? And there was no unambiguous answer. It was for
this reason that «in summer of 2011, the disorientation and
angst of the elite were felt with unprecedented strength.25»
Everything became clear on September 24, 2011 at the
Congress of the «United Russia», with the famous
«castling»: Medvedev claimed that he would not ballot for
the second term, while Putin promised to appoint him
Prime Minister after his gaining the ofﬁce. The clariﬁcation
of the situation with the election nominee was very
important, as the elite was partly reassured. However,
those who had expected that Medvedev would be able to
present a real liberal alternative to Putin were disap-
pointed. According to political writer N. Gulbinsky, «high-
proﬁle liberals» placed their stake on the second President
term of Dmitry Medvedev, who would act under their
control; when this dream did not come true, they were
bitterly disappointed, as they realized that they would not
be able to shift the force balance within the elite for their
own beneﬁt26». «The castling» inspired active discussion in
the blogosphere and numerous critical observations in the
media; in fact, that was the start of informational prepa-
ration to what would happen in December, 2011.
The fall of 2011 may be called the time of the formation
of the protest moods in the society. This process was seri-
ously affected by loosening the former system, undertaken
by Medvedev, and by the discontent of the part of the elite
that did not want Putin to be back. As we already said,
while one cannot deny the intrinsic social and economical
factors that contributed to the public unrest, serious efforts24 Glikin M., Kostenko N. Whoever instead of Medvedev!//Vedomosti,
26.08.11.
25 Palazhchenko P. The Future of Democratic Movement.//Vedomosti,
14.01.13.
26 Stepovoy A., Delyagin M. Putin is hit by the liberal kindred rather than
the opposition.//Noviye Izvestiya, 31.01.12.of liberal and «independent» media during the previous
months also promoted ripening of the «creative class» and
«angry townspeople». Such projects as «Navalny» and
many other media initiatives, which, as it is now getting
clear, were backed by business elite,27 proved to be efﬁ-
cient. It should be added that for the years of his Presidency
Medvedev encouraged the «liberal atmosphere», and
thereby in fact repeated the mistake of Gorbachev’s
«glasnost»: media criticism toward the vices of power
resulted in discrediting the power. The activities of
numerous, primarily electronic, media in 2010–2011
should be analyzed in detail: this study may answer
questions related to the erosion of the prestige of the power
and to the simultaneous increase in protest moods in the
major cities of Russia. However, the media are only an in-
strument in the ﬁght for people’s minds and attitudes.
Some experts (M. Khasin, M. Delyagin) suggest that in fact
the multithousand demonstrations in December, 2011
were backed by the «liberal kindred», which placed their
stake onMedvedev. According toM. Delyagin, the sequence
of events was as follows: «First, the liberal kindred tried to
scratch Putin off with the use of Medvedev, who proved to
be inappropriate instrument. Now, the liberal kindred tries
to scratch Putin off with the use of middle-class protest27».
In his interview to «Free Press», Retired Brigadier General of
Militia, ex-Head of the Russian Interpol Bureau, Vladimir
Ovchinsky directly says that revolution processes in Russia
were inspired “from above” and were caused by the fact
that Putin’s comeback did not suit some representatives of
the elite. «F.P.»: “That is, in your opinion, some fraction of
the power incites the opposition to another?”– V.O.: “Of
course. The “revolution from above” is underway, I already
said it. Some fraction of the political elite did not want
Putin to take the third term, they wantedMedvedev to take
the second28.” Andrey Piontkovsky, a member of The Co-
ordination Council of Russian opposition, also claims that
social upheaval is used in inner political games: «The
inﬂuential kindred of «high-proﬁle liberals» needs the
controlled protest movement in the form of streetmob, as a
means for putting pressure on top-brassers and on Putin in
the ﬁnal ﬁght for the top prize: the scepter29.»
The surnames of representatives of the «liberal kindred»
were named by a Russian political analyst S. Kurginyan at
the Rosbalt Conference: he called Timakova, Chubais and
Voloshin “those who had backed the «Bolotnaya
opposition».30
Protest demonstrations started on the squares of large
sities immediately after the publication of the results of the
State Duma election on Decenber 4, 2011. On December 10,
the number of protesters on Bolotnaya Square reached 100
thousand (according to different data sources, 25 to 150
thousand). The situation was under control, though it27 Navalny’s sponsors are now put in the public domain.//http://www.
specletter.com/news/2012-05-30/51545.html.
28 Polunin A. “V.Ovchinsky: "Bolotnaya" forms the extremist under-
ground”./"Free Press", 15 May 2012 http://svpressa.ru/all/article/55379/.
29 Piontkovsky A. The opposition as a business project of Mikhail Frid-
man 19.12.2012 //http://echo.msk.ru/blog/piontkovsky_a/972412-echo/.
30 Speech by S. Kurginyan 28/06/2012 at the Rosbalt Conference.
//http://net-perestroike-2.ru/.
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Despite the fact that the opposition and the supporting
media managed to convince many politically active citizens
that the election results had been falsiﬁed, despite the fact
that several times the opposition managed to call tens of
thousand people to the streets, the protest movement
gradually expired and ﬁnally did not any longer present any
threat for the system. The power decided to hide the «inner
conﬂicts», underlying instead the role of external factors in
the formation of the protest movement (the inﬂuence of
Washington, Tbilissi etc.). Apparently, the conﬂict inside the
elite on the background of protest moods in the late 2011 –
early 2012 was somehow ﬁxed. The decay of the protest
movement, which was gradually left by thosemost engaged
and related to power, also provides evidence that the
compromise was found «on the top». Putin came off with
ﬂying colors at President election, Medvedev took the post
of Prime Minister. However, the subsequent staff changes
(the resignation of Defence Minister, Serdiukov), and the
start of a few landmark anti-corruption trial cases at the
beginning of 2013 indicates that the ﬁght at the highest
level will continue and that its outcome for the key ﬁgures
of the contemporary Russian policy is hard to predict.
5. Conclusion
When pointing up the impact of conﬂicts inside the
political elite on the crisis events in Egypt and in Russia, the
author of this study does not deny many other social and
economical prerequisites that resulted in the wave of the
protest movement. Along with many other factors, «the
split within the elite» played an important role in the
events in both the countries. Political history has seen
many examples when power groups used people mass in
the ﬁght with their opponents, when «palace coups» were
carried out on the background of social upheaval.
Regrettably, open media yield, as a rule, very little in-
formation on processes inside the political elite; the avail-
able information is distorted and may disorient
researchers. It is obvious that the public political life (the
activity of parliaments, parties, social organizations) is only
a cover, which hides real political processes in the state.
Both in Russia and in Egypt, these processes are developed
in power elites and are closed for most citizens.References
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